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ABSTRACT: Sometimes governments choose to include ordinary people at some stage of the policy 
making process by setting up temporary and structured arenas where participants are put in a posi-
tion whereby they can deliberate on public issues and make decisions or propose suggestions. Do 
such deliberative arenas depoliticize democracy, as a vast amount of literature suggests? This article 
is aimed at challenging this point of view, by giving a close look at two cases of democratic experi-
mentation. An analysis of what actually happens in those venues shows that such arenas appear to 
display, at the same time, both unpolitical and political features. On one hand, they are non-
majoritarian bodies, just like other depoliticized venues, but on the other, they deal with conflicts 
and discuss goals, and thus perform typical political activities. It is possible to say that they are nei-
ther completely political nor completely unpolitical. They instead have a hybrid nature that can coun-
teract the continuous fluctuations between (hyper)politicization and (hyper)depoliticization that are 
so typical of our times. This implies a revision of the standard theory of politicization/depoliticization 
that does not consider the possibility of gray areas. Overcoming the rigid opposition between the 
two terms of the dichotomy can lead to the discovery of some interesting possibilities that often 
tend to be overlooked. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sometimes, though not very often, governments choose to include ordinary people 
at some stage of the policy making process. They do it by setting up temporary and 
structured arenas where participants are put in a position whereby they can deliberate 
on public issues and make decisions or propose suggestions. Situations of this kind can 
be found in a great variety of arrangements: mini-publics (citizens’ juries, citizens’ as-
semblies, deliberative polls, consensus conferences, etc.) (Grönlund et al. 2014), partic-
ipatory budgets (Sintomer et al. 2010), French débats publics on infrastructures (Revel 
et al. 2007; Marshall 2016), and the like. These forms of citizens’ involvement can be 
labeled as «deliberative arenas» (Bobbio 2003). With this expression, we can encom-
pass all the participatory arrangements in which ordinary citizens (rather than stake-
holders) interact through deliberation (rather than through negotiation or voting, as in 
referenda) in a structured and temporary way (rather than informally through media, 
social networks or in the public sphere) and are entrusted with consultations or deci-
sions regarding a public policy.  
Such arrangements are often referred to in the literature as cases of depoliticization: 
the governments that decide to delegate some tasks to such arenas take a policy issue 
from the world of politics and move it to a non-majoritarian arena, where unelected 
people tackle it with non-political criteria. It is surprising that this point of view is 
shared both by those who appreciate deliberative arenas and those who are wary of 
them. The former support them because they «depoliticize democracy» (Pettit 2004), 
i.e. they establish a space that has been freed from the bad influence of politics. The 
latter mistrust deliberative arenas exactly for the same reason (Urbinati 2014), i.e. be-
cause of their depoliticization, even though they do not praise them but blame them 
for being erroneous endeavors undertaken to reach illusory policy solutions in an artifi-
cial space, safe from social conflicts and political struggles.  
While the depoliticization of deliberative arenas is taken for granted in much of the 
current literature, in this article I will try to challenge this point of view. I will suggest 
that, at a closer look, such arenas appear to display, at the same time, both political 
and unpolitical features. They are neither completely political nor completely unpoliti-
cal. They have a rather hybrid nature that can counteract the continuous fluctuations 
between (hyper)politicization and (hyper)depoliticization that are so typical of our 
times. And this implies, as I shall show, a revision of the standard theory of 
(de)politicization that does not allow for gray areas in this dichotomy.  
I will proceed as follows. In the first section, a survey is presented of the arguments 
that have been put forward to assert the unpolitical nature of deliberative arenas, ei-
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ther for blaming them or praising them. This article is aimed at criticizing these claims. 
It does so by analyzing whether and how such a depoliticization effect came into play in 
two cases of deliberative arenas. The stories of the two cases are presented in section 
two, while sections four and five analyze, respectively, the political and the unpolitical 
features that characterized them. The final section discusses how the theory of 
(de)politicization should be reconsidered in order to acknowledge such hybrid configu-
rations. Overcoming the rigid opposition between the two terms of the dichotomy 
could lead us to discover some interesting possibilities which often tend to be over-
looked. 
 
 
2. Unpolitical practices? 
 
Are deliberative arenas unpolitical practices? Among the advocates of citizens’ de-
liberation, the author who has moved furthest in this direction is Philip Pettit (2004) in 
an article entitled, far from reticently, "Depoliticizing Democracy". For Pettit, the crea-
tion of specific forums devoted to deliberation among citizens is the fundamental rem-
edy for overcoming the shortcomings of politics. Politicians, in an elective and repre-
sentative democracy, tend to make erroneous or distorted decisions, because they are 
prompted to pursue immediate consensus and are therefore forced to, for example, 
unreasonably increase the penalties necessary to satisfy the needs of citizens’ safety or 
to take drastic but unacceptable measures against prostitution to support “people’s 
aspirational morality” (p. 55), as the “electoral interests are likely to militate against 
the deliberative quality of democratic decision-making, depriving considerations of the 
common good” (p. 53). “The only hope – Pettit went on to say – would seem to lie in 
depoliticization” (p. 55) i.e., in the creation of deliberative forums – made up of citizens 
or experts – who are able to reason on the merits of problems, irrespective of short-
term consensus. As Pettit concluded: “democracy—deliberative democracy—is too im-
portant to be left in the hands of the politicians. No democratization without depolitici-
zation.” (p. 64). Similar positions can be traced back, albeit less explicitly, to many ad-
vocates of deliberative arenas. For example, Olsen and Trenz argued that the random 
selection of participants “is not only seen by supporters as the more accurate proce-
dure to represent ‘lay publics’, it also potentially depoliticises the setting through the 
aim of avoiding conflict, does not create majorities and minorities, and thus guarantees 
high degrees of acceptance by citizens” (2014, p. 126, Italics added).  
The idea of deliberation as a rational antidote to the irrationality of politics is closely 
linked to a conception that has appeared, although not always explicitly, in many ac-
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counts of deliberative democracy. This is the idea that deliberation has an epistemic 
property, i.e. it allows some form of truth to be reached or choices to be generated 
that are wiser than those that could be obtained through other processes. The epis-
temic effect of deliberation can reside in the use of reason, which recognizes the force-
less force of the better argument (Habermas 1996), in the comparison of a plurality of 
points of view that overcome the bounded rationality of each participant (Elster 1998), 
or in the collective intelligence that emerges from the rule of many (Landemore 2013). 
Psychological experimentation has shown that a great number of people are more like-
ly to find the right solution to a mathematical or geometric problem than one solver 
alone (Mercier and Landemore 2012). And, even though the notion of a right solution 
is inapplicable to policy problems, it can be assumed that here too, by analogy, some 
epistemic progress can be attained, and that there is a greater likelihood of reaching, in 
this way, decisions that approach the general interest (Martí 2006). But, for many au-
thors, this supposed epistemic effect makes the deliberative democracy more similar 
to expertise than to politics. Citizens that are involved in a deliberative arena end up 
playing the role of an oracle; they express the vox populi (the people’s voice) which can 
be equated to the vox Dei (the God’s voice). They appear more like jurors who pro-
nounce a verdict than members of a city council who make a decision. It is not by 
chance that one of the most popular deliberative devices is that of “citizens’ juries”, 
where a group of people, drawn by lot, discusses a recommendation on an issue of 
public interest after having listened to witnesses and experts. Here, they reproduce the 
role of the jury in a criminal trial, i.e. that of establishing the truth about a controversial 
matter. 
This epistemic conception is one of the main targets of those who criticize delibera-
tive arenas as being unpolitical. Nadia Urbinati (2010), replying to Pettit, observed that 
“the strategic use of deliberation [is] an antidote against democratic politics itself”, 
that leads to “the dissolution of political judgment within a model of judgment that is 
tailored around justice” (p. 68). This unpolitical democracy “entails relocating public 
action outside the places in which political decisions are to be made according to dem-
ocratic procedures […]. It suggests that politics is a cognitive practice for reaching true 
outcomes, solving problems” (p. 74). It is grounded on a “disengaged judgment” (p. 82) 
of irresponsible citizens-judges and thus ends up by striking a hard blow against de-
mocracy, here understood as the free confrontation of positions in the fire of political 
struggle. In a more recent work, Urbinati (2014) has analyzed three conceptions that 
tend to disfigure democracy. One of these disfigurations, which she calls “unpolitical 
democracy”, is the result of “epistemic and unpolitical twists of deliberation” (p. 2). 
The deliberative arenas (or in Urbinati’s words “deliberative committees”) “do contrib-
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ute in devaluing the work of democratic institutions” (p. 112). In fact: they “reflect the 
idea that representative bodies are mainly partisan and hence irrational or incapable of 
judging the public good” (ivi), they falsely claim they represent the existing but latent 
preferences of citizens, they “may encourage elitism, impersonating citizens’ engage-
ment while actually encouraging passivity” (p. 114), and they “are made up of tutored 
citizens: spectator-judges who apply rules and procedures that others have devised 
and come to judge on facts they did not contribute in choosing” (p. 115, italics in the 
text). 
A vast amount of literature has come to not very dissimilar conclusions, starting 
from antagonistic or agonistic (Mouffe 2005) premises, for which politics (or rather 
“the political”) is the reign of conflict, and thus deliberative arenas are practices that 
are completely opposed to politics. For the advocates of a radical democracy, based on 
antagonistic pluralism, "deliberative democracy is a deeply unpolitical normative pro-
ject” (Cini 2012, p. 184), as it aims at avoiding or stifling conflict and pushes contenders 
toward improbable (and unacceptable) agreements through a “participatory depolitici-
zation” (Abram 2007). This view is shared in a growing body of literature (Bobbio and 
Melé 2015), in which deliberation, which occurs in top-down structured arenas, is 
deemed to “exhaust conflicts” (Joly and Marris 2003, p. 196), “calm the wild dynamics” 
(Mermet 2007, p.374), “anesthetize the dissent” (Algostino 2008, p. 242), turn “the 
values of radical democrats into technocratic solutions” (Bevir 2010, p. 119) and “sof-
ten and thus reduce conflicts” (Gourgues et al. 2013, p. 13). In addition, deliberative 
experiences lend themselves to the unscrupulous actions of politicians who can use 
this false democratic openness to legitimize themselves in the face of citizens without 
running any risk, since deliberative arenas can easily be manipulated (Freschi and Mete 
2009). Their aim is to take some important issues from the political game and to en-
trust them to a sort of neutral judge, thus upholding the alleged objectivity of the ne-
oliberal order (Moini 2011, Walker et al. 2015). This view has been summarized well by 
Baiocchi and Ganuza, when they write that, according to agonists, 
 
participation […] is seen as an alternative to conflictive mobilization and disruption […] 
it becomes part of a set of strategies that depoliticize conflict, and thus pave the way for 
even more aggressive neoliberal reforms of the state (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2015, p. 187). 
 
In a review of the objections that have been made against deliberative democracy, 
Luigi Pellizzoni (2013) showed that the advocates of agonistic democracy and the Fou-
cauldian critics of neoliberal governmentality deem that deliberative forums “tend to 
depoliticize the issues, favoring the established interests” (p. 96) and that “this depolit-
icization is also achieved through a strong formalization and technicization of the pro-
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cesses” (ivi). In this perspective, “deliberative democracy easily becomes a means to 
mask the hegemonic aims of certain actors and to foster a post-political drift” (p. 100). 
The random selection of ordinary people (so frequent in such devices) can be seen as a 
depoliticizing means in itself, because ordinary people “are not political” (Clarke 2010, 
p. 642) and “recruiting ordinary people for their a-political ‘common sense’ appears as 
a device for de-politicization, or for ‘taking the politics out of things’” (p. 647). 
 
 
3. Two cases 
 
Despite this broad consensus on the unpolitical nature of deliberative arenas, it is 
possible to wonder whether these practices are really so antithetical to politics. Do in-
volved citizens really behave like judges? Or like experts? Or like epistemic authorities? 
Are conflicts really avoided or stifled ? Are rationales other than the political one at 
work? The only way to respond to such questions is to give a close look at what actually 
happens in some deliberative arenas. In this article, I have chosen to discuss two very 
dissimilar (yet somewhat opposite) cases: the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly on 
the electoral reform that took place in Vancouver in 2004, and the public debate on the 
new urban highway that was held in Genoa in 2009. As the former case is international-
ly well known, few words will suffice to present it. Instead, for the latter one some 
more lines will be needed, since the device on which it is based, the French débat pub-
lic, is not very much familiar in the international literature. My sources for the Canadi-
an case are the various researches gathered in Warren and Pearson 2008; my account 
of the Italian one will be based on my personal experience (I was the president of the 
commission that ran the public debate) and on some studies (Bobbio 2010, Pucci 2010, 
Pomatto 2011). 
 
The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly  
The liberal party of the British Columbia, after having been defeated in the 1996 
elections, although they had won more votes than their competitor, deemed that the 
first-past-the-post electoral system in force in that province had to be replaced. Re-
turning to the government with a large majority, after the 2001 elections, the liberal 
party and its leader, the premier Gordon Campbell, encouraged the provincial Legisla-
tive Assembly to entrust the choice of a new electoral system to an assembly of ran-
domly selected citizens. The choice made by the Citizens’ Assembly would then be 
submitted to a referendum, where the new electoral system would have been adopt-
ed, if it had been agreed upon by 60 percent of the voters and by half of the 79 con-
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stituencies. A random sample of 15,800 electors (100 men and 100 women for each 
constituency) was drawn and each of them was requested to participate. Of the 964 
voters who had agreed to participate and had attended the meetings organized in vari-
ous parts of the province, 158 members of the assembly (one man and one woman for 
each electoral district) were drawn by lot. Since no representative of the aboriginal 
communities was extracted, two members of the First Nations, drawn from the same 
list, were added. 
The 160 members of the Citizen's Assembly on Electoral Reform were installed in 
January 2004 and worked for almost one year, at a rate of about one weekend every 
two weeks. The first phase (January-March 2004) was devoted to examining infor-
mation provided by experts of electoral systems. The second phase (May-June 2004) 
was devoted to public meetings, which were run in the province by the assembly 
members. The third and most challenging stage (September-November 2004) was de-
voted to deliberation. The members of the assembly, gathered in small groups, first 
elaborated the criteria in order to choose the electoral system. They then decided to 
narrow the examination to three of the systems: the existing first-past-the-post sys-
tem, and two proportional systems, that is, the German one and the Irish single trans-
ferable vote system. After discussing the three systems at length, two final votes were 
made in a plenary meeting. In the first vote, the proposal to abandon the current sys-
tem prevailed. In the second, the single transferable vote system won over the German 
one. The final report, entitled Making every vote count, was published in December 
2004. A few months later, in May 2005, a referendum was held. The Citizens' Assembly 
proposal was approved by the majority of the voters (58 percent), but this was not 
enough to surpass the expected threshold of 60 percent. Given the outcome of the 
vote, the premier insisted on repeating the referendum, which was replicated four 
years later in May 2009, but on that occasion 61 percent of the voters opted to keep 
the old electoral system in place.  
 
The public debate on an urban highway in Genoa 
The project to double the jammed coastal highway between Genoa-center and Gen-
oa-Voltri on an uphill tract (20 km, in an urban area, within the municipality of Genoa), 
while deemed necessary by many, had been at an impasse for decades. The 1980 pro-
ject had been blocked by an administrative judge in 1990, as a result of the firm oppo-
sition of the inhabitants of the Polcevera valley (in the city of Genoa), where the intro-
duction of the highway would have led to the demolition of many private houses (Ieraci 
1994). Two decades later, in 2008, a project for the new highway had been proposed 
again, and five different alternatives for crossing the valley had been designed (Figure 
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1). All of them would have had an invasive impact on the urban fabric and on some in-
dustrial activities, but to different extents: the downhill alternatives (nos. 4 and 5) ap-
peared preferable for transportation reasons, but on the other hand had a greater im-
pact on the dwellings; the uphill alternatives (nos. 1, 2 and 3) entailed a smaller num-
ber of demolitions, but appeared to be less rational solutions for improving the traffic. 
A conflict arose between the Regional Government of Liguria, which was more preoc-
cupied about the transportation aspects, and thus preferred the downhill alternatives, 
and the Municipal Government of Genoa, which was more worried about the consen-
sus of the citizens in the affected neighborhoods, and thus favored the uphill alterna-
tives.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Genoa 2008, the five alternative routes for the new highway 
 
At this point, the mayor of Genoa, Marta Vincenzi, believed that it would not be pos-
sible for a small number of insiders to make a decision (with the risk of falling into a 
similar impasse to that of twenty years before) and proposed to open a public debate 
on the choice of the layout. A model to refer to already existed: the débat public on in-
frastructures that had been introduced in France by a law in 1995, after the strong op-
position that had emerged among the affected population about the high speed rail-
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way line project between Lyon and Marseille in the early 1990s (Lolive 1999) and 
which, at those times, had been resorted to in that country in about forty cases (Four-
niau 2001, Revel et al. 2007, Mashall 2016). The mayor therefore chose to informally 
follow the footsteps of the débat public. A private company, Autostrade per l'Italia (AS-
PI), which was managing the highway on behalf of the Italian state, and which had to 
implement the new project, accepted this unusual procedure, as they were interested 
in attempting an innovative (and more open) way of making decisions on large infra-
structures. 
The first step – based on the French model - was the appointment, by the municipal-
ity, of an independent commission, entrusted with handling the process, and ensuring 
the dissemination of information among citizens and equal access to the debate. The 
choice fell upon four experts, all from outside Genoa (its president was the author of 
this article), who were endowed with a staff and with resources, 30 percent of which 
were made available by the City of Genoa while the rest was made available by the pri-
vate company ASPI. After a brief but intensive inquiry (some inspections and about 60 
interviews), the commission announced the opening of the public debate on February 
6th 2009. At the same time, a version of the project, drafted by ASPI in non-technical 
language, was published, and a brochure was made available to the public through the 
newspapers kiosks all throughout the city, together with a map of the alternative lay-
outs and the dates of the public hearings. The debate had to last 3 months and end on 
April 30th, 2009. During this period, 14 public and open meetings were held, mainly in 
the neighborhoods most affected by the project: 6 general meetings for the presenta-
tion of the project, 7 thematic meetings on specific features (such as transportation is-
sues, health and environment, house demolitions, etc.) with the participation of ex-
perts, often external to the Genoese context, and 1 concluding meeting.  
These meetings ended up being very crowded and turbulent. The opening of the de-
bate had the - not unexpected - effect of soliciting the mobilization of the opponents. A 
growing number of citizens’ committees, claiming to represent specific neighborhoods, 
organized demonstrations against the new highway project and attended the public 
meetings in great numbers. If the mandate received from the commission consisted 
solely in a discussion on the route alternatives, the necessity of the new motorway was 
often contested. The debate then led to a reflection on the mobility flows in the met-
ropolitan area and prompted the search for alternative ways (ordinary roads, railway) 
to cope with congestion. 
The public meetings were clearly dominated by opponents. However, the French 
public debate provides other forms of information and discussion. In the Genoa case, a 
website supplied the citizens with extensive documentation (even cartographic), meet-
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ing minutes and videos, and a discussion forum. The citizens were encouraged to write 
down their contributions to the debate, which were then published as ‘actors note-
books’ with a common graphic design. Forty five of them, sent by institutions, political 
parties, unions, associations, committees and individual citizens, were published. Some 
of these ‘notebooks’ proposed alternative layouts, which were carefully discussed by 
ASPI together with their authors. Closer meetings, representing all of the involved par-
ties, discussed the data on the traffic flows and made some propositions on how to 
grant local control over the future layout activities. 
The French public debate does not make any decisions. It ends with a report, drawn 
up by the independent commission, which outlines the arguments raised during the 
debate and leaves the proponent firm free to decide which arguments to embrace and 
which ones to reject. In the case of Genoa, the commission published its report fifteen 
days after the end of the debate, and ASPI presented the new version of the project 
within the next fortnight, after having chosen one of the five original alternatives (al-
ternative number two), but with considerable variations that had been discussed with 
the citizens during the debate. All the changes were directed at minimizing the impact 
of the infrastructure on dwellings. This solution was then adopted by the Municipality. 
In the subsequent years, ASPI worked on this basis for the final executive project, un-
der the constant control of a citizens’ committee that had been elected in 2010 in the 
neighborhoods affected by the highway, according to the suggestions that arose during 
the public debate. 
 
Safe havens vs. stormy seas 
According to the definition I gave above, both cases fall within the concept of delib-
erative arena. Both are based on the involvement of ordinary citizens. In both cases, 
the deliberative process takes place in a highly structured manner and for a predeter-
mined period of time (the Canadian assembly lasted one year, the Genoese debate 
three months). Both attach great importance to the neutral management of the pro-
cess that is entrusted to facilitators or mediators that are above the parties. In both 
cases, the role of experts is very important, and participants are invited to propose ar-
guments. 
However, the two cases implemented the idea of democratic deliberation in two 
completely different ways, and this is why they have been selected for this article. The 
difference does not only (or mainly) concern the nature of the issue under deliberation: 
a constitutional regulatory policy in Vancouver vs. the layout of a specific highway in-
frastructure in Genoa. The two cases in fact belong to two different (if not opposite) 
clusters of deliberative practices. The Canadian Citizens’ Assembly is part of the wide-
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spread strand of deliberative experiences based on the random selection of partici-
pants, where people are induced to discuss and to make decisions, after listening to 
the opinion of stakeholders and experts. Citizens’ juries and deliberative polls also be-
long to this thread, and are often referred to as mini-publics (Fung 2003). At the heart 
of these arenas, is a group of citizens who, thanks to a random sampling, are consid-
ered to be a statistically representative microcosm of the universe. The Genoa case in-
stead belongs to the French model of public debate, which takes place through open 
public meetings, where each citizen and each group has the opportunity to step in, and 
to propose topics and arguments.  
Therefore, the fundamental difference consists of the way in which the deliberative 
arena is formed and how the participants are selected. In the first case, participants are 
chosen by means of random selection, in the second case through self-selection, i.e. 
through the principle of the ‘open door’ (Bobbio forthcoming). The two models offer 
contrasting advantages and disadvantages: the first tends to sub-represent minorities, 
the second to over-represent them. For example, in the Canadian case, no members of 
indigenous communities had been extracted (and therefore were then added). In the 
Genoese case, in the same way as in all débats publics in France, the public meetings, 
since they were based on free access, were mainly formed by opponents, as these citi-
zens were endowed with more intense preferences. The people in favor of the new 
highway (presumably most of the Genoese car drivers) did not show up at the meet-
ings (however, the device of public debate provides some mechanisms to offset, at 
least in part, this imbalance). 
One consequence of the different compositions of the deliberative arenas is that, in 
the Canadian case, the deliberation was mainly cold (Fung 2003): this arrangement is in 
fact intended to subdue the fire of passions (and factions) and to allow for a rational 
exchange among participants in a protected space - a «safe haven» (Chambers 2004) - 
where deliberators, who were not previously involved in the issue to any great extent, 
feel free from pressures and are able to engage in dispassionate deliberation. In the 
case of Genoa’s public debate, the deliberation was predominantly hot: the purpose of 
the device was to bring out all the relevant arguments and thus to make the latent con-
flicts explicit. This arrangement, which is preferred by participatory democrats, and al-
so, of course, by stakeholders, consists of forums in which partisan positions are admit-
ted, where hot deliberation prevails over the cold one, and a stormy (but real) sea is 
preferred to a safe (but artificial) haven (Bobbio forthcoming). 
The conclusion of the two processes was also completely different. In the Canadian 
case, the participating citizens were given a mandate to make a decision (i.e. to choose 
an electoral system) that would then be submitted to a referendum. In the case of 
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Genoa - as in other cases of débats publics on infrastructures – the aim of the debate 
was that of pointing out all the possible arguments, objections, and suggestions, but 
the final decision was entrusted to the promoter (in this case, the private company AS-
PI) who had to choose whether and how to take into account the arguments raised 
during the debate and summarized in the final report of the independent commission 
that had run the process. However, in the case of the Genoa highway, some important 
changes in the layout had been accepted. 
 
 
4. Unpolitical arenas … 
 
It is interesting to notice that the two cases, in spite of implementing the principles 
of deliberative democracy in such different ways, do not display very dissimilar fea-
tures when analyzed from the politicization – depoliticization dichotomy point of view. 
Both experiences can first be interpreted as unpolitical processes, or more precisely, as 
special arenas that replace - at least in part - ordinary political arenas, and rely on other 
actors and other rationales. The choice of setting up ad hoc (and anomalous) processes 
was made in both cases by politicians with high levels of responsibility in the executive 
branches of their institutions: the cabinet’s premier in the Canadian case and the 
mayor of Genoa in the Italian one. They both started by acknowledging that the ordi-
nary political process had failed, or was about to fail, in tackling a specific issue, and as 
a result they felt it was necessary to look elsewhere. 
In the Canadian case, the premier of British Columbia was faced with the classic par-
adox of electoral system reform. The paradox stems from the fact that the decision is 
generally entrusted to MPs and political parties that have short term interests and who 
know (or, which is the same, they believe they know) what the advantages and risks 
that each electoral system can entail for the likelihood of their reelection are. In this 
scenario, the outcomes that are likely to prevail are either a deadlock, elicited by the 
widespread veto powers, or the rise of a winning coalition that dictates its interests, at 
the expense of the minority. How is it possible to emerge from these undesirable out-
comes and introduce a reform that reflects the general and long-term interests of the 
citizens, thus breaking the vicious circle for which MPs are, at the same time, both uni-
versalist policy makers and particularistic policy takers? The premier, who deemed the 
existing electoral system no longer acceptable, decided to circumvent the obstacle by 
entrusting the choice to an ad hoc and unprecedented citizens’ assembly. The willing-
ness to remove this important issue from the boundary of politics is very apparent. 
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The choice of the mayor of Genoa is also the consequence of a perceived political 
failure. She recalled when the project had come to a standstill twenty years earlier af-
ter the strong opposition of the inhabitants of the Polcevera valley, where – by the way 
– she had her constituency; and she feared that an uprising would again take place 
against the new project, as it entailed similar impacts on the dwellings. Moreover, she 
was also facing a conflict with the regional government, that could have led to a paral-
ysis of the decision making process, as the latter was in favor of those layout alterna-
tives that had a greater impact on the residents’ lives. The mayor then thought that 
‘politics as usual’ would lead to a stalemate or to a risky social conflict, and thus she 
decided to change the game and to open an (at least in Italy) unprecedented public 
debate. The mandate entrusted to the new arena was not as wide as in the Canadian 
case: the public debate neither made decisions nor formulated recommendations; it 
only served to publicly raise all the possible arguments concerning the infrastructural 
project. However, again in this case, the politics encountered some spoliation: the pub-
lic debate was run by an independent commission beyond the full control of elected 
politicians, and it was based on inclusion and transparency, and therefore constituted 
an arena in which a completely different game was played. A game of deliberation 
among citizens (even the angriest ones) thus replaced the games grounded on political 
exchange, secret bargaining and majority voting, so much so that the media were upset 
by the mayor’s move and accused her (with astonishing unanimity) of performing a 
demagogic and dilatory act (a charge that turned out to be completely unfounded) 
In both cases, with the opening of the deliberative process, the nature of the game 
changed. The deliberation on the merits took precedence over the other decision-
making mechanisms; there was a venue outside the world of politics to which the solu-
tion had been delegated, at least partially, albeit to a different extent in the two cases. 
 
 
5. … but not completely unpolitical 
 
If the reconstruction of the two cases were to cease at this point, we could confirm 
the views of Philip Pettit, Nadia Urbinati, and of the advocates of agonistic democracy, 
who consider deliberative arenas unpolitical venues, as being somewhat similar to a 
court, a committee of experts, or a central bank. But this is just one half of the story. In 
fact, if we give a closer look at the inner dynamics that have enfolded among the par-
ticipants in the two cases, it is possible to note that these processes were far from 
technical or dispassionate.  
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Let us take the Canadian case first. If the choice of the electoral system had been en-
trusted to a committee of experts, the parliament would have specified the goals to be 
achieved, and the experts would have worked to establish the electoral system that 
appeared most suitable to meet such criteria. The Citizens’ Assembly worked in a total-
ly different way: they developed their own criteria, thus playing a typical political role. 
It was a complex process that took months of discussion in small groups and in plenary 
meetings. Since the assembly had an inclusive nature (consisting of one man and one 
woman for each electoral district), the discussion reflected the territorial conflicts pre-
sent in the overall population of the province: the main cleavage that emerged was 
that between the less populated northern districts and the urban districts of the south. 
This entailed a controversial debate on the type of representation the electoral system 
would have favored. From this point of view, the Citizens’ Assembly acted as a political 
entity: they set, with full autonomy, the goals that had to be achieved, they found the 
way of solving the conflicts among the representatives of different territories, and 
identified the solution (i.e. the new electoral system) that appeared preferable to them 
in light of the criteria they themselves had chosen. This ‘unpolitical’ venue accom-
plished a political task that the traditional political arenas would have not been able to 
do. In fact, the electoral reform would likely have been obstructed in parliament, due 
to the opposing positions of each party. The Citizens’ Assembly had the function of re-
placing or substituting the politics, but they achieved this through political rather than 
technical activities. They did not claim to find the truth, nor the right solution, but they 
offered their fellow citizens an electoral system that - in the opinion of the participants 
- would have solved the shortcomings of the previous one and would have made “eve-
ry vote count”. 
The Genoese case is quite different, but here too the non-technical nature of the ac-
tivities that took place during the public debate is apparent (perhaps even more appar-
ent). As the problem was that of defining the layout of a new highway, it is easy to im-
agine a technical structure being entrusted with this task. In fact, such decisions are 
normally made in technical venues, sheltered from external eyes, on the basis of tech-
nical parameters, unknown by the general public and often also by the politicians 
themselves. Opening a public debate meant, on the contrary, politicizing the issue. The 
new Genova highway could have simply been a technical artifact in the hands of engi-
neers and transportation experts; or the object of an inter-governmental dispute be-
tween the Municipality and the Region for strategic reasons of political rivalry that 
were not necessarily pertinent to the substance of the matter. With the introduction of 
the public debate, the highway ceased to be a topic for just a few specialists and/or 
politicians, and it became an issue in which the perceptions, the desires, the fears and 
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the reasons of thousands of citizens with different visions and interests were brought 
in. Deliberative democracy was, in this case, a form of re-politicization, as it brought to 
light the conflicts that would have been hidden beneath the technical choices, and it 
led the citizens themselves to tackle them. This is why the debate was polarized and 
turbulent. But it also allowed the participants to focus on issues that experts would 
have found it difficult to consider. As a result of the debate, the proponent company, 
ASPI, discovered the existence of some problems that they had previously been una-
ware of. And, thanks to this discovery, they had an opportunity to change the layout at 
some points, especially in the area of Voltri and on the left side of the Polcevera valley. 
Moreover, the debate was not limited to the definition of the highway layout. Much of 
it was devoted to the advisability of the new infrastructure: alternative proposals for a 
more sustainable mobility were put forward, such as the development of transport on 
rail and the improvement of the standard roads. None of these alternative solutions 
were taken into account at the end of the process (which instead confirmed the choice 
for a highway ), but the debate served to open up a critical discussion on the proposed 
solution. In the end, the idea of alternative mobility did not prevail in that context, but 
- thanks to the public debate - it received a great deal of emphasis that may be helpful 
in future occasions. 
 
 
5. The hybrid nature of the deliberative arenas and the theories of 
(de)politicization  
 
It is obviously not possible to infer, from only two cases, that all deliberative arenas 
always display, at the same time, political and unpolitical features, and not even that 
they are “innately political” (Olsen and Trenz 2014, p. 117). We can just say that such 
arenas are not necessarily completely depoliticized, as many authors claim, but that 
there is the possibility that they also play a political role (and may even on occasion 
contribute to the re-politicizing of depoliticized issues, as the Genoese case shows).  
This assertion appears to be at odds with most of the literature that depicts 
(de)politicization as a clear-cut dichotomy, where gray zones are assumed to be non-
existent (see, among others: Burnham 2001, Flinders and Buller 2006, Hay 2007, Jen-
kins 2011, Jessop 2014, Wood and Flinders 2014). Instead, the here examined cases, 
the deliberative arenas are somehow situated in a sort of no man’s land between the 
two poles of the dichotomy.  
The problem is that the studies on the processes of (de)politicization do not clearly 
distinguish two different dimensions, which we can define – using the terms employed 
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by Greta Krippner (2011, p. 146) – as the institutional location of decisions and their 
content. From the location point of view, i.e. where decisions are made and by whom, a 
process of depoliticization occurs when politicians “attempt to move to an indirect 
governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos that they can no longer be 
reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or specific decision” (Flinders 
and Buller 2006, p. 295-6, italics in the text). In this case, politicians withdraw from the 
direct control of a certain number of functions. Issues are moved from political arenas 
to non-majoritarian bodies, according to “the politics of ABC (agencies, boards and 
commissions)” (Wood and Flinders 2014, p. 158). (De)politicization is the consequence 
of arena-shifting. 
However (de)politicization can also be observed through another dimension, i.e. the 
content of the decision making activity. According to Hay (2007), a human activity can 
be considered as political when it satisfies four conditions: choice, capacity for agency, 
deliberation and social interaction. Politics, thus, “relies on the capacity for things to be 
different” (ivi, p. 65), while “fatalism and resignation are the antithesis of politics” (ivi, 
p. 67): “a depoliticised polity is also a ‘choice-less democracy’” (Wood and Flinders 
2014, p.160). Politics also implies conflict (Jenkins 2011), or ‘friend-enemy relations’, as 
in the famous Schmittian definition (Flinders and Wood 2014, Hay 2014). 
The reason why the location and the content of (de)politicization are not clearly dis-
tinguished in this literature derives from the fact that the two dimensions are believed 
to move together in the same direction. When an issue is displaced to a non-
majoritarian body, it is inevitably processed through non-political activities and vice 
versa. It is interesting to notice that Colin Hay (2007), after having devoted a great deal 
of effort to precisely defining the content of political activity, when he comes to analyz-
ing the dynamic aspect, i.e. the process of displacement from politics to non-politics 
and vice versa, he refers exclusively to changes in the locations, which are represented 
in figure 2. There are four spheres (the governmental sphere, the public sphere, the 
private sphere and the realm of necessity), and the transfer of an issue from one to an-
other means that a step toward (de)politicization has been taken. Hay assumes that a 
change in the location entails a change in the content or that an unpolitical sphere or 
venue cannot help but generate unpolitical decisions. 
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Figure 2 – Politicization and depoliticization. Source: Hay 2007, p. 79. 
 
This assumption is likely to be well-founded in most cases, but not in the case of the 
deliberative experiments that I have just analyzed. Their location is clearly unpolitical, 
but the content of their activity displays some apparent political features. 
First, these deliberative arenas are non-majoritarian bodies that are not made up of 
elected politicians, and they behave quite differently from political venues: a different 
game is played by other actors and through other rules. Participants tend not to be di-
vided along partisan lines, as happens in other non-political arenas. This allows them to 
escape from the shortcomings of partisanship that even its advocates cannot help but 
notice (White and Ypi 2011). The discussion among the involved citizens within such 
arenas is concentrated on the merits of problems (as in committees of experts), while 
the strategic orientations, which are so common in partisan arenas, are unlikely to 
emerge. In fact, deliberative arenas are ad hoc and temporary venues formed by ordi-
nary citizens who are interested in dealing with the specific issue at stake, but do not 
expect to continue the discussion of other issues and are therefore not interested in 
linking this game to other future ones. Each issue is dealt with independently from 
others. Professional politicians, on the contrary, cannot separate their preferences on 
the merits of the problem from their preferences on power games, future alliances and 
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friend-enemy relationships. In other words, deliberative arenas break the power con-
nection between the issues: each one is dealt with on its own considering the specific 
merit or demerit it displays. This is the unpolitical side. 
Nevertheless, the content of their decision making activity cannot been defined just 
as unpolitical. At the core of any deliberation among citizens, there is a discussion on 
conflicting points of view and interests, and in this sense they tend to politicize issues 
that otherwise would be treated by experts or through secret bargains. Deliberative 
arenas discuss goals and tackle choices through conflicts, and they do not claim to 
reach some objective truth, according to parameters like science, law or the market. 
For this reason, criticisms that accuse deliberative arenas of avoiding or concealing 
conflicts do not appear well grounded: in many cases (such as the Genoese one), the 
opening up of deliberation among citizens had the effect of raising conflicts, favoring 
the mobilization of the opponents and offering them a forum they might otherwise 
have found hard to attain. Social conflict is not always crushed by participation, as 
many critics have stated, it is in fact often fed by it (Bobbio and Melé 2015), and it may 
help it (Polletta 2015).  
Moreover, most deliberative experiments have the aim of establishing inclusive are-
nas that give a voice to all the affected people. They always do this in a imperfect man-
ner, through random selection or self-selection; they may under- or over-represent mi-
norities, they may suffer from a lack of legitimacy, as the participants do not receive 
any authorization from the affected fellow citizens (Parkinson 2006), but they are still 
able raise problems and foster solutions that otherwise might not easily emerge. There 
is a third hybrid way somewhere between politicization and depoliticization, which is 
neither completely political nor completely unpolitical. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In contemporary democracies, we witness frequent oscillations between politiciza-
tion and depoliticization, between the principle of majority and the principle of truth, 
between government by politicians and government by experts. Against the inefficien-
cy of politics, its tendency for low-level compromises, its short-sightedness and its low 
credibility, a growing role of non-majoritarian bodies is often invoked and implement-
ed (Majone 2001, Petitt 2004). In extreme cases, even technocratic governments have 
replaced political ones to cope with highly critical situations, as has recently happened 
in Italy, in Greece and in a few other European countries (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 
2014). But, as Mattew Flinders and Matt Wood (2015) have pointed out, depoliticiza-
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tion or, in their terms, hyper-depoliticization “feeds, rather than balances, the intensi-
fication of individualized political demands in liberal democratic societies” (p. 364), 
thus pushing toward an opposite pole that they call hyper-democratization, i.e. “a pro-
cess in which elite groups including corporate lobbyists and media cartels increasingly 
pressurize political institutions to implement individual demands” (ivi) . A cyclical pro-
cess (or a vicious circle) is put in motion: “[t]he rise of hyper-democracy [fuels] the rise 
of hyper-depoliticization […]. The rise of hyper-depoliticization, however, [fuels] the 
rise of hyper-democracy” (ivi). But, it is possible to add that hyper-democracy also en-
tails hyper-politicization, i.e. a process in which elected politicians have a say in a grow-
ing number of even minor issues. If politics is linked to agency (Hay 2007), hyper-
politicization consists of a sort of super-agency in which politicians claim to be almighty 
and able to easily solve the most complex problems, as happens with populist move-
ments. Hyper-depoliticization is seen as a remedy to hyper-politicization and vice ver-
sa. In contemporary democracy, we are steadily navigating between the Scylla of neo-
liberal hyper-depoliticization and the Charybdis of populist hyper-politicization. 
The analysis carried out in this article shows that a possible way out of this polariza-
tion, or this vicious circle, consists in practices inspired by the principles of deliberative 
democracy. They form a third way between politics and expertise, consensus and truth, 
politicization and depoliticization. And hence they can avoid the shortcomings of both 
poles. They can play an extremely useful role in all those situations in which neither the 
experts nor the politicians are able to cope with complex problems. I am not advocat-
ing to replace political arenas with deliberative ones, or elective and representative 
democracy with deliberative democracy. I am not moving in an ‘either-or’ logic, but I 
am rather opting to placing both arenas side by side, in an ‘and-and’ logic , as suggest-
ed by the advocates of ‘deliberative system’ (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012), who try 
to imagine how to connect deliberative mini-publics to representative decision making 
(Hendiricks 2016, Setälä 2017).  
Deliberative arenas should not be seen as an alternative to representative institu-
tions and to politics, but rather as a complement to them. For many issues, such as 
choosing an electoral system or a highway layout, and for many others, it may be ad-
visable to set up a deliberative and inclusive venue that could counteract the opposite 
shortcomings of hyper-politicization and hyper-depoliticization. 
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comparée du débat sur les OGM en France et au Royaume-Uni”, Revue Internationale 
de Politique Compareé, 10(2): 195-206.  
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